Conscious inaction; an action in itself?

[Kilroy_x]

Originally Posted by devonin

I'd argue that standing next to a person doing evil things and knowing full way that you have a guarenteed way to stop them, and deciding not to stop them does in fact make you responsible -to some degree-

How? It seems your formula is proximity+knowledge=guilt. I don't understand how this is possible without either A: inaction being a violation of duty, or B: inaction containing an element of causality. In this case inaction doesn't seem to meet the criterion of A or B.

This -is- what I mean by responsible. In the small ways in which each of the people who took part in Person 2's plan to use X, knowing how X would be used, and electing to stand aside and let Person 2 carry out his plan, they are in those same small ways responsible.

So the element of causality is contained in the individual. Their ability to prevent the situation becomes an action to promote the situation whenever they contradict taking a possible action that they knew they were capable of taking.

I'm sorry, but that's no less nonsensical.

The distinction of "responsible" in a philosophical context is the same as how "significant" merely means "has -some- place in the situation, from the minisculely small to the incredibly large" and "consequences" merely means "Anything, good or bad or neutral that results from an action" my distinction of "responsible" is "Has -some- degree of effect on the outcome"

Something can't have an effect without a causal element. Anyways, let's look at potential applications for this train-wreck of reason. How many things do you know about right now that you could conceivably make a difference about? The genocide in Darfur? The AIDS epidemic? Surely you wouldn't argue that despite knowing about these and despite there being ways to help lessen them you aren't responsible because of something as trivial as lack of proximity or the scope of the issue?

See, this surprises me, I was really thinking that when presented with a case in which the person -clearly preferred- a specific outcome, that by enabling that outcome, you would grant them some degree of responsibility.

The problem is they haven't enabled the situation, they've just refrained from disabling it.

I think the difference between us in this case is that your entire thought process seems to me to be "If, after the fact, I went back and removed the person in question, would the outcome change?" And if no, then the person is in no way responsible for any of the consequences of the action.

That's the long and short of it, yes.

Where I differ is that as soon as a person -can- effect the situation, is aware that they can, and are aware of the consequences of either possible choice, they aren't outside the situation anymore, they are as inextrciably in the situation, as Person 2 and the X are, because now instead of what you present as "person 1 buys or doesn't" and "Person 2 wants to buy" I see "Person 1 can buy, denying Person 2 the chance, or Person 1 can refrain from buying, allowing person 2 the chance" as one causal situation.

No, the linking of person 1 and person 2 requires adding a different causal link. Seeing as how it's impossible to cause a preexisting condition, and seeing as how the problem stems from the preexisting condition and this is where the causal link comes from, person 1 is not guilty of taking any causal action. Not severing a causal link isn't equivalent to a causal action.

And you'll note that I said 'person 1 can -refrain- from buying' where refrain is defined as "To hold oneself back" To me, that is unavoidably an action.

It is, just not an action with causality.

You aren't "nothing" you are "deliberately, purposfully -choosing- to hold yourself back" Deciding, taking the action of "walking away from the X" is an action,

So?

and the consequences, even if only in a tiny way, are still partially yours.

There are no consequences. The action isn't causal in nature.