Relative truth and metacognation

[senate7377]

So the priniciple of Epistemic Closure, it's rather existential really, very odd concept, but some how extrmely feasable had it not been rubutted with a "shut up dick" kind of statement.

EPISTEMIC - means basically - knowledge or to seek knowledge - its greek
CLOSURE - to come to an end.

This theory gives way to the idea of skeptcal thought. Its only human anyway, but alas what exactly is human? (someone once told me that grammar is what separates men from apes...and here I thought it was the ability to reason on a higher plane, not pick our friends lice and eat it, to NOT throw shit at each other, or NOT mastrubate when we get beat up...but I digress)

To get you to better understand the principle I must first explain the theory of truth (yes theory - since truth is relative..you can prove that with a passing polygraph taken by a pathological liar. They believe they are speaking truth therefore they pass)

I had to confer with my old high school philosophy book to fill in blanks that I didnt remember anymore, but in rereading it, I surprisingly forgot very little of it (yay me). so here it goes...

epistemic theories of truth are attempts to analyse the notion of truth in terms of epistemic notions such as "belief", "acceptance", "verification", "justification", "perspective" and so on.

There is a variety of such conceptions, and they may be classified into two basic kinds:

A. Verificationist theories;
B. Perspectivalist (relativist) theories.

Verificationism is based on the idea that the mind engages in a certain kind of activity: "verifying" a proposition. The distinctive claim of verificationism is that the result of such verifications is, by definition, truth. That is, truth is reducible to this process of verification.

According to perspectivalism (or relativism), a proposition is only ever true relative to a perspective. Roughly, a proposition is true relative to a perspective if, and only if, it is "accepted" or "endorsed" or "legitimated" somehow by that perspective.
Verificationist views

Verificationism about truth comes in three main kinds:


Positivism

The process of verification involves the comparison of a statement with sensory experience. On this account, a proposition is true if, and only if, it is verifable by sensory experience.


A Priorism

The process of verification is a purely a priori process. Verification here involves a priori reflection, and results in an a priori determination of the truth value of a proposition. On this account, a proposition is true if, and only if, it is verifable by a priori reasoning. A related view is the certainty theory, associated with Descartes and Spinoza: A proposition is true if and only if it is certain, or it is known with certainty.


Pragmatism

A proposition is true if, and only if it is useful to believe.

Positivism may seem attractive to someone who thinks that all knowledge is grounded in observation and sensory experience. A priorism may seem attractive as an account of truth for the domains of logic and mathematics. The logical positivists of the Vienna Circle attempted to combine positivism with a version of a priorism. Roughly, statements are divided in to those which are analytic (and thus can be see to be true a priori) and those which are synthetic (which can be verified by sensory experience).

Perspectivist views

Turning to perspectivalism (relativism), a proposition is only ever true relative to something like a perspective. There are four main versions of perspectivalism, and some interesting subdivisions:

Individual Perspectivalism

Perspectives are the points of view of particular individual persons. So, a proposition is true for a person if and only if it is accepted or believed by that person (i.e., "true for me").

Discourse Perspectivalism (Conventionalism)

A perspective is simply any system of discourse, and it is a matter of convention which one chooses. A proposition is true relative to that particular discourse if and only if it is somehow produced ("legitimated") by the methods of that particular discourse. An example of this appears in the philosophy of mathematics: formalism. A proposition is true relative to a set of assumptions just in case it is a deductive consequence of those assumptions.

Collectivist Perspectivalism

Collectivist Perspectivalism: Perspectives are understood as collectivities of people (cultures, traditions, etc.). There are, roughly, three versions of collectivism:

Consensus

A perspective is, roughly, the broad opinions, and perhaps norms and practices, of a community of people, perhaps all having some special feature in common. So, a proposition is true (for a community C) if, and only if, there is a consensus amongst the members of C for believing it.

Fascist (Power)

On this view, a perspective is a collectivity enforced by power, authority, military might, privilege, etc. So, a proposition is true if it "makes us powerful" or is "produced by power". This view of truth is associated with Heidegger, Michel Foucault, and some social constructivists. The fascist conception of truth is summed up with the slogan that "truth is power".

Marxist

Truth-generating perspectives are collectives opposed to, or engaged in struggle against, power and authority. For example, the collective perspective of the "proletariat". So, proposition is true if it is the "product of political struggle" for the "emancipation of the workers" (Adorno). This view is again associated with some social constructivists (e.g., feminist epistemologists).

Transcendental Perspectivalism

On this conception, a truth-conferring perspective is something transcendental, and outside immediate human reach. The idea is that there is a transcendental or ideal epistemic perspective and truth is, roughly, what is accepted or recognized-as-true from that ideal perspective. There are three subvarieties of transcendental perspectivalism:

Coherentism

The ideal epistemic perspective is the set of "maximally coherent and consistent propositions". A proposition is true if and only if it is a member of this maximally coherent and consistent set of propositions (associated with several German and British 19th century idealists).

Theological Perspectivalism

The ideal epistemic perspective is that of God ("God's point of view"). A proposition is true if, and only if, it agrees with the thoughts of God.

Long-Run Scientific Pragmatism

The ideal epistemic perspective is that of "completed science", which will appear in the (temporal) "limit of scientific inquiry". A proposition is true if and only if, in the long run it will come to be accepted by a group of inquirers using scientific rational inquiry. This can also be modalized: a proposition is true if, and only if, in the long run it would come to be accepted by a group of inquirers, if they were to use scientific rational inquiry. This view is thus a modification of the consensus view. The consensus need to satisfy certain constraints in order for the "accepted" propositions to be true. For example, the methods used must be those of scientific inquiry (criticism, observation, reproducibility, etc.).

So in short - truth it relative to your perspective...everything is true yet at the same time everything is false...

To keep my explanation of Epistemic Closure from not only dragging on, but to reamin simple I'll say it like this:

It is where P and Q are propositions, if we know that P, and know that P logically entails Q, we know that Q.

Sometimes said to support skepticism, because if I know that, for example, I am holding a cup, and know that if I am holding a cup I am not merely dreaming that I am doing so, then (by the principle) I know that I am not merely dreaming this: but, it is alleged, I cannot know that I am not dreaming because even if I were, things would still appear just as they do.

Therefore, I cannot know that I am really holding a cup.

the "shut up dick" response was called "Theory of relative alternatives", which is the theory used in defending fallibilism against the charge that it leads to skepticism.

Where P and Q are propositions, P counts for this purpose as an alternative to Q if it is inconsistent with Q, and counts as a relevant alternative if to know that Q we must also know that not-P.

Variant formulations exist, but the point is that if P is a skceptical hypothesis (for example that you are now only dreaming you are reading this entry), it can be ignored if it can be shown to be not 'relevant' in the above sense.

We shall then of course need some way of deciding when P is relevant to Q in this sense.


So basically PRICIPAL OF EPISTEMIC CLOSURE says:
you are never really sure what is real, but to conclude your confusion on the matter, you have to have two parts of an equasion in order to be skeptical about it.

Then the THEORY OF ALTERNATE RELATIVES come up and kicks it in the balls and says "ok, now Im skeptical of you...what if P and Q have nothing to do with each other - then you are wrong and wasted my time...bitch!" (but thats all very loose interpretations)

Which brings us full circle and thus why I hate philosphy. I figured Id add the upper portion about relative truth so that I could further illustrate WHY philosophy is as I feel circular and requires way too much in the way of metacognation (thinking about thinking or extremely deep thought - the suffix is cognate, or to think).

So sit on that for a bit, and realize, that...aside from the "theory of self awareness", you may not even exists, because - the truth is relevant to only you...and finding exacly what catagory you fit in is a lifetime challenge as over time your views change.

Anyone under tha age of 30 who is not liberal, has no heart; anyone over the age of 30 who is not conservative, has no brain. - Winston Churchill

This is to say, for now - ya'll are safe being hippies