Metaphysics, intelligence, God

[MrRubix]

I made the situation "simple" because to make it more complicated adds nothing -- even if person Y were awake, the perspective changes during the entire transformation process. If we're assuming that we're phasing out Y-specific memory to X memory + (X+Y) memories, then all that matters is the phasing out of the processing/consciousness -- so whether or not someone is awake or asleep is irrelevant, here.

Why are you assuming that X "reappears" as a very sudden thing the moment before X is fully formed? A perspective, again, is the result of physical composition -- the atoms are irrelevant. It doesn't necessarily have to be the same atoms -- what matter is that you're not using a separate replica.

(Damn, another thought experiment coming up):

For example: Let's say we remove brain X and let it sit for a long time. Brain X, at time of death, is made of X1-specific atoms (arbitrary name). Say we leave that brain be for years and years until all the X1-specific atoms swap out for X2-specific atoms (a completely new set of atoms). Then we bring back that brain. X will regain his perspective even though all the atoms are different.

This scenario is DIFFERENT from if we had brain X chilling there, composed of X1-specific atoms, and another identical brain made of X2-specific atoms -- and we brought back the brain made up of X2-specific atoms immediately after we kill person X, whose brain is made of X1-specific atoms. Even though in both scenarios we are bringing back a brain that is made up of X2-specific atoms, we're not bringing back the same person. In this case, we can't say the two scenarios are even comparable: the X2 atoms in the first scenario are different from the X2 atoms in the second scenario. The origins are completely different -- the X1 atoms we bring back in the second scenario are part of a separate process, and the X1 atoms we bring back in the first scenario is part of a swapped-in process.

So, the atoms themselves do NOT matter -- what does matter is purely the presence of the given PARTS and whether or not those same parts are being used. The moment we deviate from this into a "what if we use these separate atoms" thought scenario, we violate this postulation DIRECTLY since we are confounding the concept of a function having an origin regarding its composition. This is technically what is meant by a "continuous" versus "discrete" case -- we can be more accurate by saying that it's the FUNCTION that needs to be present -- its composition is its own regardless of what swaps in or out. As long as the part is there, that is its part. So we can IGNORE atoms and maintain the SAME level of truth and this will make things a bit easier for us to understand.

If we destroy X's brain and then simply use those atoms to swap in with Y's brain, and then change Y's brain to resemble X's brain, what we're really doing is changing X's brain to look like Y's, swapping it into Y's head, and then changing it to resemble X again. Or, if we don't want a gradual "shift," we can just remove Y's brain and insert X's. The outcomes are the same -- X will regain his perspective, either way. In the first case, we're not 'swapping' X for Y, but rather removing Y and replacing it with the X parts altogether. It may be confusing because we're saying "well, we're using X atoms," but really we're "using X's parts." Y loses his perspective in the first case because we are phasing it out (again, even though the brain is alive, we're inserting X's brain), and in the second case, we're just removing the brain. In either case, the outcome is consistent with the notion that perspective is defined by the physical components being used.

The fact that the brain is alive is the only extent to which we say Y's perspective is a continuous one, even though he technically ceases to exist the moment we change the brain to X's. Again, this is only confusing if you're trying to impose a "soul" concept or some sort of mind-external entity. The examples we've been bringing up can be completely explained (and are consistent) with the physical argument.

It would be like fully understanding how a computer works (which we do, since humans created computers) but wondering how its soul fits in. We don't need a "soul" concept to explain a computer -- it only adds a layer of additional complexity that is almost impossible to explain such that it remains consistent with what we DO know. Likewise for humans -- it may be "easy" to "assume" that we have a soul, but it's actually MUCH more complicated to actually incorporate it into the proof of what we do know (either because it directly contradicts things or provides no new information altogether). As can be seen here, we can explain everything about human perspective with a physical argument that is not only consistent, but has no need for a soul. To invoke a soul here would be to add a layer of complexity that will keep you up all night wondering things you will never be able to prove or understand. The physical argument is complex enough to understand! It's enough to explain all questions raised so far. Do you see what I mean when I say "a soul isn't needed"? If there were a need for a soul, then we should be able to come up with a question that directly contradicts the physical argument and demands the need for an external entity of existence. However, since perspective IS defined by physical components, it's going to be impossible to throw in the notion of a soul on top of it.

Again, sorry if that was hard to understand -- unlike an essay, these forum posts are entirely stream-of-thought and without any self-editing, lol. I'll re-explain something if I did so insufficiently.



EDIT But to answer your final question: It's always worth reconsidering a postulation if there's a reason to. However, so far we have no real reason to. We can explain things sufficiently with current postulations.