What's better: being alive or not alive?

[sarahxjane]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

How would you know what being 'not alive' is?

When you're dead, I believe you are reincarnated.
Right away or not, I couldn't tell you.

If there is a transitional period, I doubt you can do anything on Earth.

Anyways, I'd rather be alive for a couple reasons:

1.) I'm alive.
2.) I can interact with people/things.
3.) I'm not dead.
4.) Some things in life are fun.




People are usually famous after they're dead though.
Take artists for example.

*Shrugs*

Not like you'll make money and prosper from it when you're dead though.




P.S: I'm not trying to spark a religion debate.

[ryanisadouche]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

Being alive is a matter of perspective. Everything is energy, and energy cannot be destroyed.

[MrRubix]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

I'm gonna have to side with Dev on this one on a practical level.

Even if we look at this question under a model of Expected Utility, we see that basically, even if we can estimate probabilities and relative utility payoffs for being alive, we can't estimate a damn thing for the state of being dead in itself. We have no idea what the probabilities are -- let alone ballpark them. We *can't* ballpark them at all. We also don't know the utility payoffs for anything because we don't know what options are available to us, if any, in death.

Even if, say, you consider a positive EU to be equivalent to "worth living" and a negative EU to be equivalent to "not worth living," you have no idea if death offers a higher or lower EU when compared to either EU payoff in the life state. Even if EU(Living) were, say, -1000, it's possible than EU(Dying) = -100,000 or something (just an example). We simply have no idea about ANYTHING regarding the death state.


****BUT, I am going to try to see if I can justify what the best option is with the Expected Utility model*****


As with many things regarding uncertainty, we can make assumptions. Assumptions, naturally, are a dangerous thing, but here is my rationale for why I feel like it's not unreasonable to do so.

I know that, in the life state, I have learned many things over the years, and I've come to various conclusions about how we came to be and how we operate. One of these things involve stochastic processes and long-term optimizations/evolutions, and I see this as being the primary driving factor behind how we came to be. In other words, I feel like small, gradual changes/processes have made us who we are today over the many iterations that our earth and universe has existed. In other words, I do not feel like we are who we are because of a God. I feel like we're the result of an optimization path.

As a result, I make the assumption that once we die, we cease to function because we are, in my opinion, nothing more than biological machines, where the components of these machines are essential for interpreting utility and existence. Without these components being active, we do not think, experience, feel, or interpret. We cease to experience utility, emotions, and so forth. Utility is primarily a human function. It is a measure of our own personal happiness. In the death state, we would be UNABLE to experience anything.

The only thing I can extrapolate about the death state is that it is no longer a life state. What I do know is that the continuation of the life state requires a proper functioning of certain biological components, which also happen to interpret utility. Without these functions, we enter the death state. Therefore I assume that in the death state, we are no longer "human," functioning in the same biological ways as we do in the life state. Since there is no evidence for the existence of any sort of of "soul" or anything that would imply a continued interpretation of utility, thought, or existence once our biological components cease to function, I feel like, to all intents and purposes, it's reasonable to assume that we only interpret utility in the life state.

Unfortunately, I don't think assigning a Utility value to anything in the death state is reasonable. If I simply say EU(Death state) = px = (100%)(0) = 0, then this implies that not experiencing utility is the same as experiencing ZERO utility -- that is, better than a negative, but not as good as a positive. I don't think such an assumption can be made. Since the death state would be one where I'd be unable to interpret my utility, I can't say it's worse or better than any relative payoff in any given state. We could "practically" assign it a value of 0, and say "not existing is functionally equivalent to being indifferent between living and dying." But again, I don't think we can assign it because it's not a "meaningful" assignment. I do not feel happiness or sadness in the death state.

BUT! What I *can* do is assign utility to the ENTERING of this state FROM the life state, which I can interpret. In other words, analyzing the utility of entering a state where I am unable to interpret anything.

If EU(Living) > 0,
this means p1x1 + p2x2 + p3x3 + ... + pnxn, the sum of all probabilities of certain payoffs occurring multiplied by their relative utility payoffs, across all possible actions we can take over all time points in our life, is positive. Which means we find living to be a good option -- we are experiencing something that makes us happy.

However, I know that death and life states are mutually exclusive. To enter the death state, I know I am giving up ALL possible utility payoffs for ALL other actions.

Therefore:
EU(Entering the death state) = (probability that I will enter the death state)*(payoff of entering the death state, including giving up life-state utility)

The death state (the other decision against the life state) has an uncertain payoff, whereas I know that ENTERING the death state means I am giving up a positive utility value. Even if I were a risk-neutral individual, indifferent between a guaranteed payoff and a payoff with equal expected value, I'd still have no basis for comparison. As a risk-averse human, I am unwilling to forgo this utility since I do not have multiple trials to regain back any utility I lose. If I die, that's it. No "retries" to see if I get a better utility. With a state of 100% uncertainty, the variance/SD/risk is not even able to be calculated -- it's literally infinitely risky. Even if expected values for events are the same, it does not mean the risk profiles are the same. With an event that only has a span of one trial, it's literally the biggest risk I can possibly take in the life state. You are *giving up* all positive utility values to enter an uncertain death state with infinite variance. Essentially, I know that by entering the death state, I will be giving up happiness, entering a state where I can not interpret utility. That, in itself, has a negative utility to me.

Since, then EU(entering death state) < 0, I don't choose it.

Therefore, it is worth living.

Sooo, that's my "mathematical/statistical" approach to proving why I would rather be alive than to not be alive.

It's a hugely longwinded way of saying "If I'm satisfied with how things are going in life, why give them up to enter an uncertain state? It's too risky."




Something interesting to consider:
What if EU(Living) < 0? This means, what if, on average, we are unhappy with our life? Entering the death state would then technically mean "giving up an average unhappiness." In this case, the utility of entering the death state is positive. We see happiness in giving up unhappiness.

So, does this mean that when we are sad, we should kill ourselves?

My answer to this is simply, not necessarily. Expected Utility, as I am describing it, is describing all events over a lifetime. Even if we have one bad event in our life, it may be counterweighted by future events of greater utility. I think if someone wishes to take their life, they are personally okay to do so. However, I'd only take my life if I were able to estimate that I'd be living a lifetime of unhappiness with no hope of gaining happiness -- if I were to actually estimate that my EU(Living) < 0.

The thing is, people who are sad fail to realize that there are always other options. Looking at the extreme scenario, if you're sad about how your life is going, then it is logically better to completely overhaul your life and take a huge risk in the life state as opposed to entering an infinitely riskier death state. Even something like quitting your job, changing your lifestyle drastically, starting your life and friend/family base from scratch, and moving to a completely new area is a better way to remove unhappiness and potentially gain happiness.

As silly as it sounds, this is the reasoning that has kept me from committing suicide once. After my father passed away, a lot of things became really messed up for me. I came very close, one time, to killing myself. However, I reasoned that it would be better to, at the VERY least, take some large risks in my life to try to feel better than it would be to die. Going into a state of nonexistence is foolish when there are potential options in life I have not yet tried. I would only kill myself if, estimated over my lifetime, I would, with sufficient evidence, not be able to pursue those options, where EU(Life)<0.

So, for most people, technically, EU(Life) is positive, even for the depressed. Just because you don't consider or understand your options doesn't mean they aren't still viable options. When you're alive, you literally have a nearly infinite range of possible routes to choose. If your life absolutely sucks, you're better off switching to a completely new route. A lot of suicidal people simply didn't do this. They may have put too much weight on locally-negative events and unreasonably assumed it made EU(life)<0. I simply can't imagine how EU(life) could be less than 0 unless you were, say, either a slave with no hope of escape faced with constant torture, or someone who, in some freak accident, lost their site/hearing/legs/arms or something. Things would have to be pretty bad for you to be UNABLE to go out and seek positive utility. It's everywhere, in many forms, and within many options.

[OrganisM]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

Once you're dead, you're dead, so you might as well pass go and collect $200 for another 'round the bend.

[TheRapingDragon]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

You don't know what its like not to be alive

Yes you do. You were "not alive" the whole time before your conception and birth. It is merely because in a physical alive state you cannot comprehend or acknowledge this previous non-existence.

Same way when you die you will never perceive your non-existence but will instead merely cease to exist.

The two can never co-exist in a single "knowledgeable thought".

[Zybanthia]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

But in a previous non-existence, you didn't exist. And if you can't exist, you can't know, correct? In order for you to learn and store knowledge in your brain, you have to have a brain. If you don't exist, you don't have a brain. So, no, you didn't know what it was like.

As for whether or not it's better if you're alive or not alive: if you're not alive, you can't make a decision on whether or not it's better to be alive, so perhaps it's better to be alive, just so you can think things like these through.

[Reach]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

But in a previous non-existence, you didn't exist. And if you can't exist, you can't know, correct? In order for you to learn and store knowledge in your brain, you have to have a brain. If you don't exist, you don't have a brain. So, no, you didn't know what it was like.

As for whether or not it's better if you're alive or not alive: if you're not alive, you can't make a decision on whether or not it's better to be alive, so perhaps it's better to be alive, just so you can think things like these through.

The problem with this argument is that there was nothing to know, so whether or not you knew is irrelevant. It's not possible to obtain knowledge about something that is void of everything (other than that, by definition, it is void of everything.)

As such, asking whether or not you can know what it's like to not be alive is pointless, since it isn't 'like' anything, given that it is by definition the absence of everything.


As for the actual question, it's also pointless without parameters, given the word 'better' is arbitrary. You can't make an argument for or against something without first being able to define it, which was precisely the problem with trying to contrast 'likeness' with nothing.

[Minion133]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

gay

[wienerschmidtzel]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

Mmhmm, good point, because for one thing to be better than another, we need to have some orientation of which direction is good and which direction is bad. What qualities are prioritized to make one thing seem better than another? And in order to do that, we need a definition of both terms, so it's kinda hard.

Yeah, I mean essentially good and bad are human-made concepts. Nothing is universally good or bad because there's always someone who feels differently. Frankly I find life enjoyable though I believe there's no real point. I think a better idea is would you rather be turned into a zombie? I mean yeah I'd probably try not to become a zombie at first but eventually who knows? Maybe being a zombie is a really fulfilling endeavor.

[OrganisM]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

i would have to say ghost is a better. somebody who is alive is too hard -_-

You like flaccid ghost-penis?

[Mans0n]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

simple answer: kill yourself and find out.

[Zybanthia]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

...asking whether or not you can know what it's like to not be alive is pointless, since it isn't 'like' anything, given that it is by definition the absence of everything.

I completely agree. That question, though, is not where the value is; the value is within being able to ask the question, whether the question is pointless or not. In that respect, it is "better" to be alive, but like you said, "better" really is subjective, isn't it.

[ShAiOnEi]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

I'd rather live.

[Tater Tot]

Re: What's better: being alive or not alive?

If you're sick of living but don't want to die, you could always become one of the undead. Just saying.