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Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
Yeah, I guess I needed to make a topic like this... so, here it is.
Warning: Needless hypothetical situation as vehicle for concept follows. A person walks into a store and browses around, as people frequently do. He sees a product for sale and contemplates buying it, but ultimately decides not to do so, leaving the store. The store owner retains the product and the person retains his money. Now, it is surely true that the decision to refrain from the purchase constitutes an action, but an action in what sense? Can we claim it is an action which is causal in nature? There seem to be two states of affairs which correspond to the decision, namely the retainment of money on the part of the would-be shopper and the retainment of the product on the part of the would-be seller. However, the money was in the hands of the shopper to begin with, and the product the hands of the merchant. Nothing has changed as a result of this action. Now, let's look at another situation. In addition to the first person walking into the store, another person does so as well. They have the observable intent of buying the product. However, if this person buys the product they will use to to, I don't know, let's say to make all mashed potatoes slightly less delicious tasting. In this instance, our not quite propagandistic nameless scenario person has to decide whether to buy the product before the other person, or to let events take their course. He chooses the second option. Is he responsible for the actions taken by our mild annoyance causing nameless scenario villain? He didn't fulfill any active role in establishing conditions which would lead to the actions of the second person. All he did was refrain from rearranging conditions to prevent a course of action. So, the question which in this scenario is grave as gravy is, did our random person violate a duty or the rights of others by conscious inaction, and if so how is this derived? |
Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
Some questions for clarification:
1/ In your scenario, did the second person announce his intention to the first person to buy the item and his purpose in doing so? 2/ In your scenario, is there only one remaining copy of the product that the first is indifferent about and the second is desirous of obtaining? My stance on inaction being an action has always only applied to situations in which the person is both aware of the consequences of the situation at hand, and is also aware of their own ability to effect the situation, so I would like those points clarified before I respond fully. |
Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
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Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
Okay, so we have the situation set up like this:
A) Person 1 goes to the store, thinking maybe he'll buy an X, maybe he won't. B) Person 2 is there at the store and says "Hey, I'm totally going to go buy an X and use it to make all mashed potatoes slightly less delicious tasting" C) Person 1 goes into the store, and sees that there is in fact, only 1 X left. Now, at this point, you seem to want to say that he has two choices: a) Buy the X, or b) refrain from buying the X. Full stop. To me, he has two choices also: a) Buy the X, knowing that it will stymie the plan of Person 2, and b) Refrain from buying the X, knowing that having done so, Person 2 will buy it and use it to make all mashed potatoes slightly less delicious tasting. In this situation, since person 1 is in a position where he understands the consequences of acting and not acting, and has the ability to make a choice which will directly effect the outcome of the situation, I would feel that if he buys the X, he is at least in some small way responsible for mashed potatoes remaining as delicious tasting as they do, and that if he refrains from buying the X, he is at least in some small way responsible for mashed potatoes becoming slightly less delicious tasting. Don't think that when I say "responsible" I mean -fully- responsible, or even -mostly- responsible. A great deal of the responsibility lies on Person 2 for using the X to make mashed potatoes slightly less delicious, a certain small amount lies on the shopkeeper for stocking an X in the first place, and to a small degree, person A does (to me) have to acknowledge that when he stands there looking at the X, knowing full well the consequences of acting and not acting, that some degree of the consequences are his to enjoy. |
Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
Here's the problem. While I would agree that by taking action, he holds some responsible for the continuation of current levels of mashed potato deliciousness, by refraining from action I don't see how he can be. How can a person be responsible for another persons actions? At what point does another persons action cease to be a product of their (perhaps less than) free will and begin to be a product of your (perhaps also less than) free will? While I can see this being the case in at least some instances hypothetically, I'm not sure how an unexercised will can be responsible for anything. IE, there's no element of causality in inaction.
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Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
But see, by standing there -knowing- what will happen if he doesn't buy the item, by not buying the item he is tacitly going along with the consequences of not buying it.
If he had never had any intention of buying it at all, he may not even have gone to see if there were any, but since he was already considering buying it, was made aware of the consequences of buying or not buying, I can't see how he -isn't- at least partially responsible for the consequences. Bear in mind the extent to which I'm minimizing his responsibility in this particular instance, I'm just putting it at non-zero. Lets cast the situation in a differant light: Say Person A -hates- mashed potatoes, always has, always will, and when he gets there to buy the X, and sees there is only one, thinks to himself "No way am I buying that, I can't wait for mashed potatoes to become slightly less delicious, smug side dish" He is -still- choosing inaction, but in this case, he has deliberately done to -because- he wants the consequences. Does he bear any responsibility in this case to you? In both cases he had the chance to buy it or not, and by not, has enabled the consequences. |
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The distinction of "responsible" in a philosophical context is the same as how "significant" merely means "has -some- place in the situation, from the minisculely small to the incredibly large" and "consequences" merely means "Anything, good or bad or neutral that results from an action" my distinction of "responsible" is "Has -some- degree of effect on the outcome" Quote:
I think the difference between us in this case is that your entire thought process seems to me to be "If, after the fact, I went back and removed the person in question, would the outcome change?" And if no, then the person is in no way responsible for any of the consequences of the action. Where I differ is that as soon as a person -can- effect the situation, is aware that they can, and are aware of the consequences of either possible choice, they aren't outside the situation anymore, they are as inextrciably in the situation, as Person 2 and the X are, because now instead of what you present as "person 1 buys or doesn't" and "Person 2 wants to buy" I see "Person 1 can buy, denying Person 2 the chance, or Person 1 can refrain from buying, allowing person 2 the chance" as one causal situation. And you'll note that I said 'person 1 can -refrain- from buying' where refrain is defined as "To hold oneself back" To me, that is unavoidably an action. You aren't "nothing" you are "deliberately, purposfully -choosing- to hold yourself back" Deciding, taking the action of "walking away from the X" is an action, and the consequences, even if only in a tiny way, are still partially yours. |
Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
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I'm sorry, but that's no less nonsensical. Quote:
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Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
It really just seems that the terms we are both using commonly in our posts are simply being defined in different ways by you than by me. As long as the words I'm using have a meaning for me that differs from yours, and vice versa, we're going to keep circling each other without any satisfactory conclusion. I'll respond anyway, and while I think we are making some progress on seeing clearly where the other one is coming from, I suspect as we go, that we're going to end up at some sort of "Well, the way you define the words, yes you're right, but I define them in a different way" situation.
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If you want them to stay how they are, but decide not to buy the X and prevent their reduction in deliciousity, then to me yes, you have committed a violation of duty, albiet a very small one. Quote:
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Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
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Expanding on your example: If you know that a certain product would case undesirable outcomes for a lot of people, and you have it in your power to prevent that product from falling into the hands of someone who would use it, then I'd say it's your responsibility to do so. It's hard to get too excited about mashed potatoes and therefore difficult to put things in perspective (as far as I know, there is no law against making mashed potatoes more bland than they already are)...but if the situation is more...life and death, with more dire consequences, it's easier to see. Hypothetically, say there is someone in a room who will suffocate if you don't release them by pulling a lever. You have two options, pull the lever and free them, or don't and let them die. In this case, conscious inaction is known as involuntary manslaughter (recluse disregard for human life, knowledge of circumstances that would reasonably cause a person to foresee that such conduct might be a threat to the lives of others). In this case, inaction is an action. It requires conscious effort, and last time I checked, thinking is an action. Quote:
Likewise, in what way is it my responsibility to end the AIDS epidemic? Again, I don't have the time, money or knowledge to invent the cure for AIDS. I don't have AIDS, I don't know anyone who has AIDS. |
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in a moral sense of this level of responsibility, and the appropriate action to take resultingly? You've eliminated your connection to the causality of the issue, so how can you be responsible in any sense for the outcome? Quote:
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I don't place responsibility on you, that's the whole point of my position. Quote:
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Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
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If I value my money higher than I value the deliciousness of mashed potatos, then I will likely choose to save my money rather than buy X and prevent the consequences of person 2 buying X. I still say that you therefore bear some responsibility for the consequences, but freely admit that the degree is quite small, and person 1 probably won't -care- that they bear some responsibilty, but that doesn't mean they -dont- Quote:
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Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
Well, I don't know what to say, except that you seem to be unwilling to tackle the issue of morality except from a very foolish angle. Starting with emotions and then trying to express them in terms of logic or reason isn't actually searching for truth, it's just searching for self-justification. Or as Nietzsche put it, why should it be so convenient that what you feel is right overlaps with what actually is right?
Even if I were to accept your system, it doesn't seem to have any room for evaluating morality. It ultimately collapses in much the same way as Perspectivism. |
Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
The problem is that you seem to assume that in my system, all this being responsible for things must result in horrible self-loathing and guilt.
There is -plenty- of room in this system for just not giving a **** about the fact that you bear some responsibility for things. Sometimes people take -credit- for the contributions they make via "Not interfering" just as much as they try to say that because they didn't interfere they deserve no credit at all. |
Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
I don't care one way or another whether responsibility entails moral responsibility, although given that this was the assumption I had of what the discussion was about I'm sort of thrown off. I also don't care whether people think themselves responsible or not responsible, only whether they are. I don't think there is a connection between perceived and actual responsibility, causality is the only link in responsibility, perception and emotion play no role.
At this point though I wonder if there's even a point to arguing, because you're saying "There is some, necessarily undefined level of responsibility applicable to all existing entities for all existing situations, which may or may not have a link to some, necessarily undefined level of moral responsibility, which may or may not allow for moral evaluation based on personal values, in a way that remains open-ended and undefined". How could such a statement even pretend to have substance to refute? |
Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
If you grant, for a moment, that inaction as I defined it -does- count as an action, which allows for your particular kind of feeling of responsibility; can you at least see how in such an instance, the degree to which you then are responsible is irellevant, and the degree to which you may or may not feel morally good or bad about it becomes irellevant in the statement "I am responsible"?
If you can see how given that circumstance (even though I know you disagree with that circumstance) your summation of as Quote:
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Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
Intuition is a type of "understanding" I would prefer to rid myself of.
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Look, I understand what you're trying to say, it just isn't something which can be substantiated. the notion itself isn't particularly offensive to me, although what the notion is used for seems problematic, but my main concern is that there is no way to give your position any foundation outside of language, and while part of the problem may simply be that we're using different language, my language at least pretends a distinction between the real and the ideal and some applicability of its descriptive function to the state of affairs of reality. A reality. A real one. |
Re: Conscious inaction; an action in itself?
Well, I mean it comes down to the fact that I consider knowing you can act, and choosing not to, to be a deliberate -action- and like all actions, has consequences.
To me, you're putting the cart before the horse and saying "Unless there are -outside consequences- you haven't acted" Where to me, the actions you -enabled- by -choosing- to not act -are- the consequences of that action. Basically, I consider "refraining from disabling" and "enabling" to be functionally the same thing, and you do not. |
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