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Incompatibilism
In an effort to get a discussion going here at CT, I decided I'd post a short paper I wrote for my philosophy class. It's about the relationship between determinism and free will. The paper itself was my first draft; I did the second on campus, so I didn't end up saving it. Some of the points aren't completely fine tuned, and the last paragraph is horribly weak since I spent about two minutes on it.
Regardless. Rather than critiquing my paper, I hope it will spark a discussion. Articulate your viewpoint on the matter. What did you agree with, disagree with? Take a little time to understand the subject before posting. Anyways, here it is. In reading this first paragraph, it’s suggested that the reader asks itself a few questions. First, is it truly free will that allowed one to read this paper? Secondly, was it either determined that one would read this paper? It’s expected that one will find itself thinking, “Of course I choose to read this paper, not anything else!” However, this may perhaps not be the case, from a philosophical perspective. Maybe it’s free will that is allowing it. Maybe it’s predetermined that one is to read this. Maybe it’s both. In this essay we’ll be exploring a large subject that numerous figures in philosophy have dealt with- determinism and free will. My thesis is simply to assert the notion of incompatibility as opposed to compatibility; why one should choose the former over the latter. The most logical place to start then is to define compatibilism. It’s a perspective which claims that free will is compatible with determinism. The two are consistent with each other, and most compatibilists will go as far as to say that free will is dependant upon determinism (the other choice being indeterminism). But what does that mean, what are its implications? To understand that, we should explain determinism and free will. Determinism is a proposition where every event in time is determined by prior actions that have taken place. This is translated in a few different views and variations. Theological determinism states that some god is determining all events. Logical determinism states that all claims about events, in any time, are either true or false. For the sake of this paper, we’ll be using nomological (casual) determinism. This states that past events in combination with the laws of nature necessitate all future events. As shown with Laplace’s famous demon, if you know everything that has happened, and all the laws of our universe, then you can theoretically predict whatever shall come to pass. What this means for us simple thinking things is that our actions are also determined. They are still meaningful, and perhaps even still conscious and deliberated, but still determined because of the past and the laws of nature. Whether or not this affects our free will is something that both compatibilists and incompatibilists try to answer. Free will has been related in a number of ways. It’s perhaps the most daunting subject of the philosophical world, and certainly one of the most contested. What we will refer to it as is a commonly accepted form. Free will is the ability a thinking thing has to choose between alternatives- suggesting that whenever one of us is presented with multiple choices, we have the capability to decide upon one choice instead of the others. One could stop reading the paper here, or one could continue reading. Free will would state that one continued reading because one had the alternative of not reading on, but decided to act on the other choice of continuation. Moral responsibility is tied directly to free will. When we possess the freedom of our actions, it follows that we can be held responsible for our actions. Likewise, without free will, it is impossible for us to be held responsible for our actions. We can now come back to compatibilism. It’s first assumed, for a compatibilist vantage, that determinism is true. Next, it’s assumed that within this deterministic world, free will also maintains to be true. At first glance this may appear to be a contradiction, but it isn’t. Not surprisingly, it depends on how you interpret free will. Hume, for example, provides that free will isn’t the ability to make a different choice under the exact same circumstances. Rather, it’s the (hypothetical) ability to make a different choice under different circumstances. When one continues to read this paper, we aren’t asserting that one choose to read over not reading. We assert that the desire to read caused it to continue. Had the desire been different, the choice made would also be different. With these conditions, compatibilism seems to work. Now that it’s understood what compatibilism is, we can begin to discuss against its case. What we’re arguing for is just the opposite of compatibility. We’re arguing for incompatibility. Free will is incompatible with determinism. Meaning that free will is true and determinism is false (libertarianism), or that free will is false and determinism is true (hard determinism). Adhering to this incompatibility are a few staple arguments that we will assume to. Our first argument is known as the intuition pump. Let’s suppose that determinism is true (a necessary condition for compatibilism). Determinism states that the past, in combination with the laws of nature, determines what our actions will turn out to be. What that tells us is, in a sense, we are no different from that of a robot. Each one of our actions is casually determined, just like the programming in a robot. We are determined to act a certain way because of this. Furthermore, we have only one way, a way in which we have no control over- just like a robot. We’re simply reacting as we’re programmed to act. When certain conditions are given to a person, the person is guaranteed to act a certain way. The laws of nature dictate our conduct. All we are are just greatly advanced robots, that aren’t fully understood (yet; otherwise, we’d be like Laplace’s demon). This lack of free will is potentially one consequence of a determinist viewpoint, as this example above shows. The next argument is in regards to causation. Again, we’ll suppose that determinism is true. A criminal acts out against another person, shooting him in the face, killing him. In this, it is possible to state that the criminal cannot be held responsible for his action (an outrageous claim from an ethical standpoint). Yes, it was he that did it, but he isn’t necessarily the primary cause for his action. Since determinism explains that our actions, as well as ourselves, are the products of past events, it follows that we can only be held accountable for the actions- not responsible. This is because the causation of these actions doesn’t originate within us. The criminal’s desire to pull the trigger was caused by his current mental state, which was caused maybe by an unstable situation, which stemmed from the two seeing each other on that day, and so forth, all the way back to the criminal’s birth. Once again, we find that a consequence of determinism is the lack of free will. Last is an argument that was hinted at in the previous two- the consequence argument. A normal, thinking thing cannot possibly have control over the past, or over the laws of nature. This is true for any viewpoint. If determinism holds true, and we are the products of the past and the laws of nature, then we can’t possibly be held responsible for the consequences of either. We don’t have control over any of the consequences from the past or the laws of nature, and for ourselves, as we are also consequences of these. For every action that we do, it is the only action that we could’ve done at that time. If we do otherwise (even hypothetically), then we’re either creating or contradiction, or changing either the past of the laws of nature. One continues reading this because that is the only choice that exists. To have done anything else would mean one of the following: something in the past changed that lead to the cause of this, a law of nature was changed that allowed this, or a contradiction, a logical fallacy, has arisen. This argument renders us in a world where, when determinism is true, free will can’t possibly be true. Hopefully I’ve demonstrated why an incompatibilist viewpoint is preferable to a compatibilist one. Whether you choose to be a libertarian, or are destined to be a hard determinist, or any incompatibilist philosophy for that I matter, is entirely your action. I can’t decide for you, but only share my perspective. |
Re: Incompatibilism
Well, I don't like determinism as an explaination for everything, nor free will explaining everything.
I think I MIGHt be able to argue free will from an psychological perspective, but not from a philosophical perspective. I don't think you can get anywhere on this issue using purely philosophy. Current psychological models equate mind to brain. Essentially, they are the same, and one is derived from the other (conciousness derived from the brain). So your conciousness, all of your actions and thoughts are manifestations of the brains working processes. Now then, what forces govern the brain? I think we need to get really small here. Smaller than neurons. All of the atoms that make up those neurons are governed by quantum mechanical processes. It is absolutely impossible to know for certain exactly what is happening inside the brain at any given time (or anywhere for that matter); it is governed by probability at the smallest scale of existance. So then, I think one needs to ask the vital question; if the very foundation of our conciousness at the smallest scale is governed by probability how could it possibly be predetermined? The answer is it is impossible. I sort of have an idea that the entire universe in itself is an undeterminal process where any event in it cannot be predicted with certainty. I guess humans are the work of this higher manifested probability...potentially 'utility' that was possible from the beginning but didn't necessarily have to happen. I think evolution would make a lot less sense from a predetermined position. If all of our thoughts are predetermined then why would evolution happen? Why would bigger brains evolve? To utilize more 'predeterminism?'. I don't know, it doesn't make much sense. It only makes sense if you throw out evolutionary mechanisms and say that the whole universe was a predetermined plan from the beginning. and that I don't believe is true XD edit: The Copenhagen interpretation, due largely to the Danish theoretical physicist Niels Bohr, is the interpretation of quantum mechanics most widely accepted amongst physicists. According to it, the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics predictions cannot be explained in terms of some other deterministic theory, and does not simply reflect our limited knowledge. Quantum mechanics provides probabilistic results because the physical universe is itself probabilistic rather than deterministic. Which is why I don't believe in determinism. The universe isn't deterministic. However, I don't necessarily think that we have no free will either. |
Re: Incompatibilism
As far as determinism goes, it doesn't necessarily say that everything is predetermined from the start, although the means do justify those ends. Rather, ever since the big bang*, each particle has moved a certain way, and because of the laws of nature, each particle after that can only move another certain way because of the laws our universe is governed by. One long stream of casuality (one wave function?). Though, I suppose you could infer that everything is predetermined- I just perfer to stray away from that notion, since that implies fatalism, which I personally dislike.
*Don't mention 'well what comes before the big bang?', or anything along the lines of first cause. Nobody knows. Regarding quantam mechanics... well, that's not my field of expertise. From what I understand (and correct me wrong), is that a lot of it comes down to probablistic spin theory, when taken in the 'smallest scale'. If it is indeed random, then from a philosophical perspective, we're in the same boat. That just implies the logical opposite of determinism, which is indeterminism- not ALL actions are determined. Some of their are indeed random. And if a random event occurs, then we have no control over it, and hence, no responsibility. Although, I'm not sure if this microperspective would still apply to the macroperspective (living, thinking organisms like us), but I don't see why it wouldn't. As far as chaos theory goes... elaborate on what you mean. What I got from Chaos Theory is that, mathematically, there's irregular behavior, but still is based upon activity preceeding it. The determinist (unfortunately) will say that these things, such as weather patterns, which appear chaotic, are actually still determined; we simply don't have enough information to be able to realize it's predictability. I've always found the logical backbone of a determinist, like a skeptic, to be disappointing, since it's just shifting the burden of proof. But it works. |
Re: Incompatibilism
When I said chaos I was mostly just referring to random events resulting from quantum mechanics.
Which I just realized was my own misinterpretation. The difference between chaos and quantum probability is that chaos is deterministic and the quantum world is not. Quantum mechanics is pretty complicated. But the quantum scale isn't...really, the only thing you need to know (for the sake of this argument) is that on the smallest possible scale of measurement things happen completely randomly. You can only try to describe them in terms of probability. Quote:
Not necessarily. This is assuming the the brain is inately unable to process information in such a way that allows us to make sense of random events and put together information in a non random way to be able to make a choice. Basically, just because all matter is composed of randomly moving particles doesn't necessarily mean consciousness is a random process. There's an assumption made there. Which just opens up another window. The problem with this argument is that either way you argue it, you have to make an assumption at some point. |
Re: Incompatibilism
(note: responding to the 2nd post. took a while to type.) reach, imo, the universe was predetermined but the way you say "plan" implies a god. anyway, i do agree that no event can be predicted with certainty but this is because there are such an incredible number of forces + you can't observe all the individual atoms and all the things that make up atoms (quarks and such) AND all their relative velocities without a machine several times larger than the universe.
also, your argument that evolution of bigger brains doesn't make sense because there is no reason to evolve them in a predetermined system doesn't work. the brain would still evolve because it DOESN'T know that its a predetermined system. evolution isn't a conscious entity. the brain changes based on its environment and the brain is far too complex for us to understand but its still just a part of the chain reaction of forces that makes up the universe except that it can do different things in different situations based on instinct and past experiences. i believe that we believe in free will only because the reactions in our brain are far too complex for us to understand. only a brain several thousand times more advanced than our own could completely understand our brain and only a brain even more complex than that could understand it and so on. therefore, you could never understand your own brain completely no matter how smart you were. |
Re: Incompatibilism
I disagree on so many points.
Quote:
You can't predict what is going to happen because of the quantum world, which is essentially everything on the atom scale. Everything here happens RANDOMLY, governed only by certain probabilities. There is no order and quantum (random) forces act on everything here, which in turn ends up acting on everything else because atoms compose everything else. Even with this huge machine you're talking about, you still wouldn't be able to predict what is going to happen (with 100% certainty). Quote:
And uh, sure there is a reason to evolve bigger brains. It's called natural selection, and if intelligence is fit than intelligence will evolve. Quote:
And no, the brain is not too complex for us to understand. You sound like someone from 1000 ad or something. Psychology is a wonderful thing. edit: I found what I was talking about earlier on wikipedia actually XD The Copenhagen interpretation, due largely to the Danish theoretical physicist Niels Bohr, is the interpretation of quantum mechanics most widely accepted amongst physicists. According to it, the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics predictions cannot be explained in terms of some other deterministic theory, and does not simply reflect our limited knowledge. Quantum mechanics provides probabilistic results because the physical universe is itself probabilistic rather than deterministic. |
Re: Incompatibilism
"I sort of have an idea that the entire universe in itself is an undeterminal process where any event in it cannot be predicted with certainty." how is my agreeing with that have nothing to do with your post?.
and im aware that you would never be able to completely measure these, but i couldn't remember what the theory/principle/whatever is called exactly so i tried to explain it in another way. " I think evolution would make a lot less sense from a predetermined position. If all of our thoughts are predetermined then why would evolution happen?" i hate how you constantly deny what you're saying. here you said that you believed theres no good reason for evolution, and now you're saying the exact opposite. also, i believe the brain is too complex because we can, using psychology, understand it somewhat, but i'm talking about how all the millions of brain cells interact and create consciousness and such. if you can completely understand all the inner workings of the brain, please explain for us. :) |
Re: Incompatibilism
I remember hearing about a theory some smart guy was working on that tried to prove even quantum mechanics were deterministic, driven by forces on an even smaller scale then matter called 'events' that drove the quantum forces in a certain, potentially predictable way.
Honestly, how can we know for sure that quantum theory is random? It might just be an incredibly chaotic system, even more chaotic then the material world, that seems so random that you couldn't tell the difference. On the other hand it's a lot more morally acceptable if quantum mechanics indeed provide an element of randomness; wiggle room; the relief from knowing you can choose your future and not have it set on stone. |
Re: Incompatibilism
if quantum mechanics were random, but everything else was deterministic in accordance with what happened at the quantum level, then wouldn't it really be the random stuff happening at the quantum level determining what you do, and not you? that would mean that we still wouldn't have free will but would just do slightly varying things based on that.
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