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MrRubix 12-3-2009 12:10 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
I made the situation "simple" because to make it more complicated adds nothing -- even if person Y were awake, the perspective changes during the entire transformation process. If we're assuming that we're phasing out Y-specific memory to X memory + (X+Y) memories, then all that matters is the phasing out of the processing/consciousness -- so whether or not someone is awake or asleep is irrelevant, here.

Why are you assuming that X "reappears" as a very sudden thing the moment before X is fully formed? A perspective, again, is the result of physical composition -- the atoms are irrelevant. It doesn't necessarily have to be the same atoms -- what matter is that you're not using a separate replica.

(Damn, another thought experiment coming up):

For example: Let's say we remove brain X and let it sit for a long time. Brain X, at time of death, is made of X1-specific atoms (arbitrary name). Say we leave that brain be for years and years until all the X1-specific atoms swap out for X2-specific atoms (a completely new set of atoms). Then we bring back that brain. X will regain his perspective even though all the atoms are different.

This scenario is DIFFERENT from if we had brain X chilling there, composed of X1-specific atoms, and another identical brain made of X2-specific atoms -- and we brought back the brain made up of X2-specific atoms immediately after we kill person X, whose brain is made of X1-specific atoms. Even though in both scenarios we are bringing back a brain that is made up of X2-specific atoms, we're not bringing back the same person. In this case, we can't say the two scenarios are even comparable: the X2 atoms in the first scenario are different from the X2 atoms in the second scenario. The origins are completely different -- the X1 atoms we bring back in the second scenario are part of a separate process, and the X1 atoms we bring back in the first scenario is part of a swapped-in process.

So, the atoms themselves do NOT matter -- what does matter is purely the presence of the given PARTS and whether or not those same parts are being used. The moment we deviate from this into a "what if we use these separate atoms" thought scenario, we violate this postulation DIRECTLY since we are confounding the concept of a function having an origin regarding its composition. This is technically what is meant by a "continuous" versus "discrete" case -- we can be more accurate by saying that it's the FUNCTION that needs to be present -- its composition is its own regardless of what swaps in or out. As long as the part is there, that is its part. So we can IGNORE atoms and maintain the SAME level of truth and this will make things a bit easier for us to understand.

If we destroy X's brain and then simply use those atoms to swap in with Y's brain, and then change Y's brain to resemble X's brain, what we're really doing is changing X's brain to look like Y's, swapping it into Y's head, and then changing it to resemble X again. Or, if we don't want a gradual "shift," we can just remove Y's brain and insert X's. The outcomes are the same -- X will regain his perspective, either way. In the first case, we're not 'swapping' X for Y, but rather removing Y and replacing it with the X parts altogether. It may be confusing because we're saying "well, we're using X atoms," but really we're "using X's parts." Y loses his perspective in the first case because we are phasing it out (again, even though the brain is alive, we're inserting X's brain), and in the second case, we're just removing the brain. In either case, the outcome is consistent with the notion that perspective is defined by the physical components being used.

The fact that the brain is alive is the only extent to which we say Y's perspective is a continuous one, even though he technically ceases to exist the moment we change the brain to X's. Again, this is only confusing if you're trying to impose a "soul" concept or some sort of mind-external entity. The examples we've been bringing up can be completely explained (and are consistent) with the physical argument.

It would be like fully understanding how a computer works (which we do, since humans created computers) but wondering how its soul fits in. We don't need a "soul" concept to explain a computer -- it only adds a layer of additional complexity that is almost impossible to explain such that it remains consistent with what we DO know. Likewise for humans -- it may be "easy" to "assume" that we have a soul, but it's actually MUCH more complicated to actually incorporate it into the proof of what we do know (either because it directly contradicts things or provides no new information altogether). As can be seen here, we can explain everything about human perspective with a physical argument that is not only consistent, but has no need for a soul. To invoke a soul here would be to add a layer of complexity that will keep you up all night wondering things you will never be able to prove or understand. The physical argument is complex enough to understand! It's enough to explain all questions raised so far. Do you see what I mean when I say "a soul isn't needed"? If there were a need for a soul, then we should be able to come up with a question that directly contradicts the physical argument and demands the need for an external entity of existence. However, since perspective IS defined by physical components, it's going to be impossible to throw in the notion of a soul on top of it.

Again, sorry if that was hard to understand -- unlike an essay, these forum posts are entirely stream-of-thought and without any self-editing, lol. I'll re-explain something if I did so insufficiently.



EDIT But to answer your final question: It's always worth reconsidering a postulation if there's a reason to. However, so far we have no real reason to. We can explain things sufficiently with current postulations.

MrRubix 12-3-2009 01:11 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by mhss1992 (Post 3295970)
Yet, again, that observer will only come back with the exact same brain of the moment of his death.
...
Do you get the "magical recording" thing? What is it that restricts a "dead" observer to a specific state of brain, materially speaking?

If the observer was just purely dependent on the brain, we could say that any observer could be called any time, because every configuration would be connected to a single observer. But that's not the case. There are several configurations for a single observer.

And that's why I think that the observer is something else: Something that is connected to the many states of a brain, but not necessarily limited by them. I can actually imagine that.

I can see how this notion is tough to put into words. I can assure you though that approaching it physically makes everything so much easier to grasp (that, and we can answer any question with the physical postulation).

Observer X will be brought back if we bring back X's brain. We can change the brain theoretically to resemble whatever we want it to -- as a brain, it'll keep perceiving and functioning as long as it's a working brain. Of course, the sense of "who's at the helm" depends on how that specific brain is structured.

Let me pose to you another scenario that may make things easier to understand what exactly it means to be an observer bound by the brain.

Consider people who end up with certain extreme types of seizures and need to have half their brains removed (assuming a mere severing of the corpus calossum is insufficient). They still retain their perspective/consciousness/sentience, regardless of which half I remove. Despite the somewhat functionalist arguments debated in this thread, we can say that self-identity and perspective is maintained in either side of the brain (even based on empirical findings -- even if we lose certain functions if we remove a given half). We have people living with only their left halves, and we have people living with only their right halves. And yet, they are still observers with the same sense of perspective and identity.

And so, if each side of the brain is home to processes that give us our perspective/identity/sentience, what would happen if we split a guy's brain (say, me) in two and were able to plant each half in two new bodies? Well, we'd have two people now, and yet they'd have a shared origin. However, they are now technically separate people -- only, as we've always said, their perspective is defined by the physical functions. The person with the left brain retains left-brain functions (plus any natural rewirings depending on age) and the sense of "I am MrRubix," and the person with the right half of the brain retains right-brain functions (also plus any natural rewirings depending on age) and the sense of "I am MrRubix." Again, even though I have technically severed myself in two from a unified, shared perspective, I have now split that perspective such that I am now living two, separate lives.

So what if I wake up and find myself the MrRubix with the left brain? "I am indeed MrRubix, but why didn't I wake up as the right-brained MrRubix?" This is because that body has the left brain. Therefore that perspective is defined by the left brain. Likewise with the right brained MrRubix. He's wondering why he didn't wake up as the left. But, in both cases, they wake up the people that they are because of the physical components that define them, even if they have a continuous existence.

So what are we really saying? When we have both halves of our brain in one body, we could also argue that this is the same as having two separate self-sustaining entities and possible observer sources working together in one body. If you want an "easy explanation," it's like saying we have two observers in one body -- only they are technically working together as one cohesive observer.

We can also remove additional parts from a half-brain and still retain perspective (although we lose more and more functionality) -- as long as we don't remove the parts that are essential for self-identity, or rather the parts that are integral in the processing of memory or sensory data. Whatever part of the brain is kept alive is kept perceiving, no matter where it is.

Similarly, if we could remove half a brain from two people and swap those halves, then those people would wake up with a shared sense of perception/sentience/identity assuming we could wire them together cohesively.

Again, our status as an observer depends entirely on the parts that compose us.

mhss1992 12-3-2009 07:48 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by MrRubix (Post 3295979)
Why are you assuming that X "reappears" as a very sudden thing the moment before X is fully formed? A perspective, again, is the result of physical composition -- the atoms are irrelevant. It doesn't necessarily have to be the same atoms -- what matter is that you're not using a separate replica.

Well, we have a problem (again).

On my second post of this thought experiment, I asked:
"If I recreate your brain with the very same atoms that formed it when it was disintegrated, will it bring you back?"

You did say "yes".

But then I asked, later:
"What if I recreate your brain with different atoms (different individual atoms, but same composition, in case it wasn't clear), but the very same configuration? Will it bring you back?"

You said "No, because it’s Just a replica."

Well, now you're saying that the individual atoms don't matter (which I agree. I actually said in the very first post of this thought experiment that atoms don't have their own "perspective", they don't really matter in this situation), what matters is the composition.

I'm afraid you just moved the paradox to somewhere else.

If the individual atoms don't matter, there is nothing that stops me from creating many brains with the same material composition and configuration. In the end, you're just saying that an absolutely perfect replica still works as the same brain.

Because, well, if I can recreate your brain with the same composition, theoretically, there's no limit to how many times I can do that.

That means that many brains can wake up and have your memories and thoughts. Many brains can feel exactly like you.

But that doesn't mean that *you*, the person who died and stopped experiencing things, will actually feel that you woke up in one of those brains. Do you see the difference? (I remember that you said this option was actually bogus BS, but I can see how your own words eventually lead to it)

What happens? Will you still be in the void while there are many identical MrRubix brains around the world?
Will you reappear in one specific brain?

I guess you know what each answer means.

Quote:

Originally Posted by MrRubix (Post 3295979)
(Damn, another thought experiment coming up):

For example: Let's say we remove brain X and let it sit for a long time. Brain X, at time of death, is made of X1-specific atoms (arbitrary name). Say we leave that brain be for years and years until all the X1-specific atoms swap out for X2-specific atoms (a completely new set of atoms). Then we bring back that brain. X will regain his perspective even though all the atoms are different.

Exactly. And you just strengthened my points with the paradox.

Quote:

Originally Posted by MrRubix (Post 3295979)
This scenario is DIFFERENT from if we had brain X chilling there, composed of X1-specific atoms, and another identical brain made of X2-specific atoms -- and we brought back the brain made up of X2-specific atoms immediately after we kill person X, whose brain is made of X1-specific atoms. Even though in both scenarios we are bringing back a brain that is made up of X2-specific atoms, we're not bringing back the same person. In this case, we can't say the two scenarios are even comparable: the X2 atoms in the first scenario are different from the X2 atoms in the second scenario. The origins are completely different -- the X1 atoms we bring back in the second scenario are part of a separate process, and the X1 atoms we bring back in the first scenario is part of a swapped-in process.

Yes. I guess it makes sense to think that the X observer was still in the X1-specific atoms brain, in this case.

But, still, this scenario doesn't solve the paradox I just mentioned, at all.

In fact, it worsens it:

If you can say, for sure, that the person X will not come back with the X2-atoms brain, because the perspective was in the X1-atoms brain, What will happen after I disintegrate(damn, I was spelling it wrong the whole time) the X1 brain?

Well, once disintegrated, there are no more “parts”. This is the problem, considering what can happen after those working parts no longer exist.

Considering this last situation you mentioned, I can also say, for sure, that the identical X2 brain will not bring the person back after X1 was gone. Neither will a X3, X4, ..., Xn identical brain.

But you did say, posts ago, that the person would come back with the X1-atoms brain.

That means that the observer is still connected to the specific atoms, somehow.

And that goes against what we've concluded: "specific atoms don't matter". In this case, they really weren’t supposed to matter, since there are no working parts.

But, still if we suppose that they are connected to specific atoms after death: A "nonexistent” thing cannot be connected to atoms. It doesn't make any sense. Therefore, the observer did not cease to exist.

Is the observer the atoms? No, it can't be. We know that. The brain swaps it's atoms all the time.

Okay, now you can say that "Even with the same atoms and same composition, that will still not bring the person back".

Well,



It's the same brain. The same atoms, configuration, thoughts, memories. The same everything. If the same person that died does not wake up from the void and start experiencing things again,


then,







OBSERVER AND BRAIN ARE NOT THE SAME.






… Do you see?
Every option will lead to either an absurd situation or the eventual denial of a previous proposition.

Quote:

Originally Posted by MrRubix (Post 3295979)
So, the atoms themselves do NOT matter -- what does matter is purely the presence of the given PARTS and whether or not those same parts are being used. The moment we deviate from this into a "what if we use these separate atoms" thought scenario, we violate this postulation DIRECTLY since we are confounding the concept of a function having an origin regarding its composition. This is technically what is meant by a "continuous" versus "discrete" case -- we can be more accurate by saying that it's the FUNCTION that needs to be present -- its composition is its own regardless of what swaps in or out. As long as the part is there, that is its part. So we can IGNORE atoms and maintain the SAME level of truth and this will make things a bit easier for us to understand.

Ok.
Again, once a brain was disintegrated, it will no longer have working parts.
What happens if I bring the first paradoxal situation in this reply?
If we can ignore atoms, that means I can create an endless number of identical brains. If none of these brains bring back the original observer, again, observer and brain are not the same.

Quote:

Originally Posted by MrRubix (Post 3295979)

It would be like fully understanding how a computer works (which we do, since humans created computers) but wondering how its soul fits in. We don't need a "soul" concept to explain a computer -- it only adds a layer of additional complexity that is almost impossible to explain such that it remains consistent with what we DO know. Likewise for humans -- it may be "easy" to "assume" that we have a soul, but it's actually MUCH more complicated to actually incorporate it into the proof of what we do know (either because it directly contradicts things or provides no new information altogether).

Sorry, Rubix, but I still find paradoxes.

I am not forcing paradoxal situations, I just naturally stumble upon them.

I can’t see how a “soul” directly contradicts anything that’s physically proven. Can you please give me an example?

MrRubix 12-3-2009 07:50 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
"On my second post of this thought experiment, I asked:
"If I recreate your brain with the very same atoms that formed it when it was disintegrated, will it bring you back?"

You did say "yes".

But then I asked, later:
"What if I recreate your brain with different atoms (different individual atoms, but same composition, in case it wasn't clear), but the very same configuration? Will it bring you back?"

You said "No, because it’s Just a replica.""


In the first case I assume you mean that we're destroying a given brain and then simply resurrecting that same brain. This is no different from the second case you brought up -- if we bring back something that wasn't the original brain, then we're not bringing back the original observer. Apologies if that was unclear.

MrRubix 12-3-2009 07:52 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
"Well, now you're saying that the individual atoms don't matter (which I agree. I actually said in the very first post of this thought experiment that atoms don't have their own "perspective", they don't really matter in this situation), what matters is the composition.

I'm afraid you just moved the paradox to somewhere else.

If the individual atoms don't matter, there is nothing that stops me from creating many brains with the same material composition and configuration. In the end, you're just saying that an absolutely perfect replica still works as the same brain.

Because, well, if I can recreate your brain with the same composition, theoretically, there's no limit to how many times I can do that.

That means that many brains can wake up and have your memories and thoughts. Many brains can feel exactly like you.

But that doesn't mean that *you*, the person who died and stopped experiencing things, will actually feel that you woke up in one of those brains. Do you see the difference? (I remember that you said this option was actually bogus BS, but I can see how your own words eventually lead to it)

What happens? Will you still be in the void while there are many identical MrRubix brains around the world?
Will you reappear in one specific brain?

I guess you know what each answer means.
"



I didn't move the paradox anywhere -- I directly refuted your claim and resolved the paradox. If you recreate multiple replicas of my brain, then you are creating new brains with memories/etc, even though their personal perspectives were created as soon as you made a new brain. If I am simply being copied, then I of course maintain my own perspective. This doesn't clash against any BS claim I made earlier.

A replica is a replica. It isn't the same as the original.

MrRubix 12-3-2009 07:53 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
" Originally Posted by MrRubix View Post
(Damn, another thought experiment coming up):

For example: Let's say we remove brain X and let it sit for a long time. Brain X, at time of death, is made of X1-specific atoms (arbitrary name). Say we leave that brain be for years and years until all the X1-specific atoms swap out for X2-specific atoms (a completely new set of atoms). Then we bring back that brain. X will regain his perspective even though all the atoms are different.

Exactly. And you just strengthened my points with the paradox.


Not at all! This was just explaining why atoms are technically irrelevant.

MrRubix 12-3-2009 07:55 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
"Yes. I guess it makes sense to think that the X observer was still in the X1-specific atoms brain, in this case.

But, still, this scenario doesn't solve the paradox I just mentioned, at all.

In fact, it worsens it:

If you can say, for sure, that the person X will not come back with the X2-atoms brain, because the perspective was in the X1-atoms brain, What will happen after I disintegrate(damn, I was spelling it wrong the whole time) the X1 brain?

Well, once disintegrated, there are no more “parts”. This is the problem, considering what can happen after those working parts no longer exist.

Considering this last situation you mentioned, I can also say, for sure, that the identical X2 brain will not bring the person back after X1 was gone. Neither will a X3, X4, ..., Xn identical brain.

But you did say, posts ago, that the person would come back with the X1-atoms brain.

That means that the observer is still connected to the specific atoms, somehow.

And that goes against what we've concluded: "specific atoms don't matter". In this case, they really weren’t supposed to matter, since there are no working parts.

But, still if we suppose that they are connected to specific atoms after death: A "nonexistent” thing cannot be connected to atoms. It doesn't make any sense. Therefore, the observer did not cease to exist.

Is the observer the atoms? No, it can't be. We know that. The brain swaps it's atoms all the time.

Okay, now you can say that "Even with the same atoms and same composition, that will still not bring the person back".

Well,



It's the same brain. The same atoms, configuration, thoughts, memories. The same everything. If the same person that died does not wake up from the void and start experiencing things again,


then,


OBSERVER AND BRAIN ARE NOT THE SAME.


… Do you see?
Every option will lead to either an absurd situation or the eventual denial of a previous proposition."

The observer is only connected with the X1 atoms to the extent that they form the same structure. That structure may very well be disintegrated ashes of a brain. If I swap in one atom for another, the new atom becomes part of the "original structure" even though it is made of new parts. Therefore if you could bring that structure back, you bring back the original. Atoms do not matter.

Observer and the brain ARE the same.

MrRubix 12-3-2009 07:57 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
"Ok.
Again, once a brain was disintegrated, it will no longer have working parts.
What happens if I bring the first paradoxal situation in this reply?
If we can ignore atoms, that means I can create an endless number of identical brains. If none of these brains bring back the original observer, again, observer and brain are not the same."

If we create an endless number of identical brains, then we have an endless number of observers. If we've merely created a bunch of replicas and killed the original, then the original is of course dead.

Again, observer and brain -> linked.

MrRubix 12-3-2009 07:58 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
"Sorry, Rubix, but I still find paradoxes.

I am not forcing paradoxal situations, I just naturally stumble upon them.

I can’t see how a “soul” directly contradicts anything that’s physically proven. Can you please give me an example?"

A soul is not necessary to explain anything. We can explain everything physically. If you're going to assume a soul, you're buying into another line of arbitrary "maybes."

mhss1992 12-4-2009 06:13 AM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by MrRubix (Post 3296301)
I didn't move the paradox anywhere -- I directly refuted your claim and resolved the paradox. If you recreate multiple replicas of my brain, then you are creating new brains with memories/etc, even though their personal perspectives were created as soon as you made a new brain. If I am simply being copied, then I of course maintain my own perspective. This doesn't clash against any BS claim I made earlier.

A replica is a replica. It isn't the same as the original.

Quote:

Originally Posted by MrRubix (Post 3296301)
The observer is only connected with the X1 atoms to the extent that they form the same structure. That structure may very well be disintegrated ashes of a brain. If I swap in one atom for another, the new atom becomes part of the "original structure" even though it is made of new parts. Therefore if you could bring that structure back, you bring back the original. Atoms do not matter.












Quote:

Originally Posted by MrRubix (Post 3296301)
A replica is a replica. It isn't the same as the original.
...
Atoms do not matter.







Okay, I might be crazy but I see a huge contradiction, here.

You said that the disintegrated ashes of a brain are still a structure.
It's not living, it's not perceiving anything. There are no working parts.
I thought that we could imply that a disintegrated brain would not enter the "replace life with life" category.

We can spread the ashes all around the world. There will be no "structure", then. I guess that there is no difference between making a brain with different individual atoms and swapping the atoms in the ashes one by one.



If the atoms don't matter, that means that, after the brain was disintegrated, I could create identical brains and they would still bring the person back. But you're saying that the person is only coming back with the X1-atoms which were spread all over the world, forming no structure at all.

So the person is still connected to the X1 specific atoms and only to them.
If the observer is connected to atoms even after there's no brain or parts or structure whatsoever, then the observer still exists and is clearly not the brain. It's something else.



Sorry, but it feels like, once you read my conclusion, you convince yourself that you've solved the paradox. But it seems like, when you answer a situation, you ignore the answers you gave to the other situations. And then you finish with "a soul is not necessary/ we can explain everything with the current postulations", as if it were the simplest thing in the world.



Tell me, if the atoms don't matter, what's the difference between two identical brains with exactly the same composition? Why will only specific atoms bring a person back?

Edit: Try to think about these problems as if the several identical brains were activated at the same time.

MrRubix 12-6-2009 01:27 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
Sorry, been busy.

What I mean is that you can have a certain function -- but its composition is irrelevant to the extent that atoms swap in for its structure over time. Even though the end-state may be of completely different atom-source than the initial state, it's the same functionality.

Consider that, if the physical argument is indeed true, this makes sense. The observer depends entirely on the functions that derive it. So why does this also make sense with different atoms? If you're making a replica with different atoms, that is a different source. Yes, the end results may be isomorphic, but we're talking about the same body, here. We're technically shedding our atoms over time and, under your argument implications, "shifting our observer from one body to the next," which is true -- but we are not shifting our observer, just maintaining our core functionalities and changing its structure slowly over time.

If you're saying "kill person X, why isn't person Y acceptable now because they're made up of the same atoms that X would have become anyway/you then imply a linkage to atoms/etc." Yes, atoms matter to the extent that they define a structure, but do not matter in terms of the functionality itself, which is what gives us our perspectives. We're talking a swap here through the same body.

There is a difference between bringing about a 100% swap over time and just pointing to a replica. The implications are different.

mhss1992 12-7-2009 12:07 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by MrRubix (Post 3297688)
Sorry, been busy.

Ah, okay.

Sorry, I know that post was unnecessary. I just wondered because I saw you replying to other threads in the meantime.

Quote:

Originally Posted by MrRubix (Post 3297688)
What I mean is that you can have a certain function -- but its composition is irrelevant to the extent that atoms swap in for its structure over time. Even though the end-state may be of completely different atom-source than the initial state, it's the same functionality.
...
There is a difference between bringing about a 100% swap over time and just pointing to a replica. The implications are different.

Alright, I do understand this.



But I was trying to point at a different problem: What happens after there is no structure left?

This time, let's suppose that not only your brain, but also your body was completely disintegrated, and the atoms were spread around the world. They are completely disconnected, now: there is no structure, no functionality.

What is it that differentiates the original and a replica, now?
Try looking through the perspective of the original observer.

I can create many identical brains and bodies, again, but they will certainly have their own observers. I mean, the original will not emerge from one of those new brains, I suppose.

But what about the original atoms? Does it still make sense to suppose that, if I recreate body and brain with the atoms that were spread, it will bring the original back?

We do know that individual atoms do not matter, after there is no structure.

If we suppose that the original is indeed coming back only with the original atoms, doesn't that mean that there was still something that connected the original observer to the original atoms?

If we suppose that the original is not coming back with an identical body and brain made with the original atoms: isn't that against the definition that observer and brain are the same? Because, well, it is the same brain.



We make the distinction between "original" observer and replicas of the observer because we understand that a perspective is not defined only by thoughts and memories. Otherwise, it would be the same observer for every identical brain, which is, by definition, impossible. Don't you think that both options are troublesome for the materialist belief, once we understand what an observer is?

MrRubix 12-7-2009 04:58 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by mhss1992 (Post 3298290)
Ah, okay.

Sorry, I know that post was unnecessary. I just wondered because I saw you replying to other threads in the meantime.



Alright, I do understand this.



But I was trying to point at a different problem: What happens after there is no structure left?

This time, let's suppose that not only your brain, but also your body was completely disintegrated, and the atoms were spread around the world. They are completely disconnected, now: there is no structure, no functionality.

What is it that differentiates the original and a replica, now?
Try looking through the perspective of the original observer.

I can create many identical brains and bodies, again, but they will certainly have their own observers. I mean, the original will not emerge from one of those new brains, I suppose.

But what about the original atoms? Does it still make sense to suppose that, if I recreate body and brain with the atoms that were spread, it will bring the original back?

We do know that individual atoms do not matter, after there is no structure.

If we suppose that the original is indeed coming back only with the original atoms, doesn't that mean that there was still something that connected the original observer to the original atoms?

If we suppose that the original is not coming back with an identical body and brain made with the original atoms: isn't that against the definition that observer and brain are the same? Because, well, it is the same brain.



We make the distinction between "original" observer and replicas of the observer because we understand that a perspective is not defined only by thoughts and memories. Otherwise, it would be the same observer for every identical brain, which is, by definition, impossible. Don't you think that both options are troublesome for the materialist belief, once we understand what an observer is?

http://uwf.edu/jgould/documents/Mind...roblem_000.pdf

Anyways I would say that we are definitely more than just thoughts and memories -- we indeed have a process that defines "us" and our perspective/conscious mind. I would say that the mind is indeed just a process of the brain at work -- but regarding your question, I would say atoms are only irrelevant insofar as swapping in and out of a function. If you destroy the function, then you need to replace it with the same parts. Otherwise this is really no different from a transplant. But then let's consider a claim, "I want a full body transplant. Arms, legs, brain, everything." This would be like just killing the original guy and pointing to another man, saying "Alright, done, you're the transplant." I think we can replace parts of ourselves over time and keep ourselves FUNCTIONING to re-assimilate, as long as the mind is able to continue its process.

mhss1992 12-8-2009 12:32 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
I read the text from the link, alright.

But honestly, MrRubix, you are insisting on repeating something that I already agree with. You're not facing the exact problem I mentioned.

Sorry if it feels repetitive, but I don't feel like you're giving an answer to the same thing I'm talking about.


Let's try this again:

Your atoms were scattered across the world.

I can now create bodies with the same composition and configuration of your original body. They will feel like they were you, the original one. One of these bodies will have the same atoms from your original body.

But the question is: will you, the person who actually experienced the death, reappear in one of those bodies(you will BE one of them)? Will you still feel nothing, as if you were in the void?

Just choose an option, and I'll make more questions.

devonin 12-8-2009 01:28 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
It seems incredibly obvious to me that if your body were completely reconstituted into its componant atoms, and you then created a body that was qualitatively identical to me, and then found some means by which to grant that body sentience, that it would share no memories, experiences or anything else with me, as I'm dead and it's a completely different being.

Izzy 12-8-2009 01:31 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by devonin (Post 3298756)
It seems incredibly obvious to me that if your body were completely reconstituted into its component atoms, and you then created a body that was qualitatively identical to me, and then found some means by which to grant that body sentience, that it would share no memories, experiences or anything else with me, as I'm dead and it's a completely different being.

Seems obvious to me to. Unless it had the same memories and experiences. Then it would be a completely different being who thought it was the exact same being.

Paqrat 12-8-2009 01:51 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
To me all it sounds like your doing is replicating the thought of reincarnation but with science.

devonin 12-8-2009 03:28 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
To me it sounds like 3 days is not a week, so please stop posting.

mhss1992 12-9-2009 03:33 PM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by devonin (Post 3298756)
It seems incredibly obvious to me that if your body were completely reconstituted into its componant atoms, and you then created a body that was qualitatively identical to me, and then found some means by which to grant that body sentience, that it would share no memories, experiences or anything else with me, as I'm dead and it's a completely different being.

That was not the question, at all. And your body was not reconstituted before the others were created, I didn't say that.

The problem is this: our atoms are swapped during our lifetime, therefore, it's not the individual atoms that define the person.

But, after your body was completely disintegrated, there's nothing else that connects you to those individual atoms. So, if I recreate your body several times, with the same composition and configuration, same thoughts and memories, will one of them actually be you?
Will you only be brought back if I recreate your body with the same individual atoms that formed your original body?

It's not just about bringing someone who feels like you and has your thoughts, it's about "you" coming back from the nothing and perceiving the world from one of those bodies. And it's not as simple as it seems.

MrRubix 12-10-2009 09:53 AM

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by devonin (Post 3298756)
It seems incredibly obvious to me that if your body were completely reconstituted into its componant atoms, and you then created a body that was qualitatively identical to me, and then found some means by which to grant that body sentience, that it would share no memories, experiences or anything else with me, as I'm dead and it's a completely different being.

This.


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